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This paper proposes a new mechanism by which country size and international trade affect macroeconomic
volatility. We study a multi-country, multi-sector model with heterogeneous firms that are subject
to idiosyncratic firm-specific shocks. When the distribution of firm sizes follows a power law with
an exponent close to -1, the idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on aggregate output
volatility. We explore the quantitative properties of the model calibrated to data for the 50 largest economies
in the world. Smaller countries have fewer firms, and thus higher volatility. The model performs well
in matching this pattern both qualitatively and quantitatively: the rate at which macroeconomic volatility
decreases in country size in the model is very close to what is found in the data. Opening to trade increases
the importance of large firms to the economy, thus raising macroeconomic volatility. Our simulation
exercise shows that the contribution of trade to aggregate fluctuations depends strongly on country
size: in the largest economies in the world, such as the U.S. or Japan, international trade increases
volatility by only 1.5-3.5%. By contrast, trade increases aggregate volatility by some 15-20% in a
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Output volatility varies substantially across economies: over the past 35 years, the standard
deviation of annual real per capita GDP growth has been 2.5 times higher in non-OECD
countries compared to the OECD countries. Understanding the sources of these dierences
is important, as aggregate volatility itself has an impact on a wide variety of economic
outcomes.1
This paper investigates the role of large rms in explaining cross-country dierences in
aggregate volatility. We show that the impact of shocks to large rms on aggregate volatility
can help account for two robust empirical regularities: (i) smaller countries are more volatile;
and (ii) more open countries are more volatile. The key ingredient of our study is that the
distribution of rm size is very fat-tailed { the typical economy is dominated by a few
very large rms (Axtell, 2001). In a recent contribution, Gabaix (2011) demonstrates that
under these conditions idiosyncratic shocks to individual rms do not cancel out and can
instead generate aggregate uctuations (see also Delli Gatti et al., 2005). Gabaix (2011)
provides both statistical and anecdotal evidence that even in the largest and most diversied
economy in the world { the United States { shocks to the biggest rms can appreciably aect
macroeconomic uctuations. The economy is \granular," rather than smooth.
We develop a theoretical and quantitative framework to study the consequences of this
phenomenon in a large cross section of countries. The analysis is based on the canonical
multi-country model with heterogeneous rms in the spirit of Melitz (2003) and Eaton et al.
(2011), implemented on the 50 largest economies in the world. In order to study the impact
of large rms on aggregate uctuations, the equilibrium total number of rms is determined
endogenously in the model, and the parameters are calibrated to match the observed rm
size distribution. The solution procedure targets the key aggregate country characteristics
{ GDPs and average trade volumes { and successfully reproduces a number of non-targeted
features of the micro data, such as the share of exporting rms and the relative size of the
largest rms across countries.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the model endogenously generates
a negative relationship between country size and aggregate volatility. The reason is that
smaller countries will have a smaller equilibrium number of rms (a result known since at
least Krugman, 1980), and thus shocks to the largest rms will matter more for aggregate
1Numerous studies identify its eects on long-run growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995), welfare (Pallage
and Robe, 2003; Barlevy, 2004), as well as inequality and poverty (Gavin and Hausmann, 1998; Laursen and
Mahajan, 2005).
1volatility. In eect, smaller economies are less diversied, when diversication is measured
at the rm level. The model matches this relationship not only qualitatively, but also
quantitatively: the rate at which volatility decreases in country size in the model is very
similar to what is observed in the data. Both in the model and in the data, a typical
country that accounts for 0.5% of world GDP (such as Poland or South Africa) has aggregate
volatility that is 2 times higher than the largest economy in the world { the U.S..
Second, trade openness increases volatility by making the economy more granular. When
a country opens to trade, only the largest and most productive rms export, while smaller
rms shrink or disappear (Melitz, 2003). This eect implies that after opening, the biggest
rms become even larger relative to the size of the economy, thus contributing more to
aggregate output uctuations. In the counterfactual exercise, we compute what aggregate
volatility would be for each country in autarky, and compare it to the volatility under
the current trade costs. It turns out that at the levels of trade openness observed today,
international trade increases volatility relative to autarky in every country. The importance
of trade for aggregate volatility varies greatly depending on country characteristics. In the
largest economies like Japan or the U.S., aggregate volatility is only 1.5-3.5% higher than
it would have been in complete autarky. In small, remote economies such as South Africa
or New Zealand, trade raises volatility by about 10% compared to autarky. Finally, in
small, highly integrated economies such as Denmark or Romania, international trade raises
aggregate volatility by some 15-20%.
The theoretical link between country size, trade openness, and volatility we explore in
this paper has not previously been proposed. Head (1995) and Crucini (1997) examine the
relationship between country size and volatility in a 2-country international real business
cycle (IRBC) model. In those papers, the smaller country has higher volatility because the
world interest rate is less sensitive to shocks occurring in that country. Thus, following a
positive shock it can expand investment without much of an impact on interest rates.2 Our
explanation for the size-volatility relationship is qualitatively dierent, and relies instead
on the notion that smaller countries have fewer rms. When it comes to the relationship
between trade openness and volatility, existing explanations have focused on the propagation
2The Supplementary Web Appendix implements the canonical IRBC model of Backus et al. (1995), and
examines the relationship between country size and volatility, and between trade openness and volatility,
in that model. It turns out that while the calibrated IRBC model can produce higher volatility in smaller
countries, the relationship between country size and volatility in that model is two orders of magnitude
atter than what is observed in the data. The relationship between trade openness and volatility in the
IRBC model is ambiguous, its sign depending crucially on the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods.
2of global demand or supply shocks (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984; Kraay and Ventura, 2007).
We show that trade can increase volatility even if the nature of shocks aecting the rms
is unchanged upon opening. Finally, the mechanism in our model resembles the traditional
arguments that smaller countries, and more open countries, will have a less diversied
sectoral production structure, and thus exhibit higher volatility (see Katzenstein, 1985;
OECD, 2006; Blattman et al., 2007, among many others). Our analysis shows that this
argument applies to individual rms as well as sectors, and makes this point quantitatively
precise by calibrating the model to the observed rm size distribution.
Our work is also related to the empirical literature that studies macroeconomic volatility
using disaggregated data. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) explore the importance of sector-
specic shocks in explaining the relationship between a country's level of development and
its aggregate volatility, while di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009, 2011) use sector-level data
to study the openness-volatility relationship. Canals et al. (2007) analyze sector-level export
data and demonstrate that exports are highly undiversied, both across sectors and across
destinations. Furthermore, they show that this feature of export baskets can explain why
aggregate macroeconomic variables cannot account for much of the movements in the current
account.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical regularities
that motivate our study, as well as some novel stylized facts about rm size distributions
in a large cross section of countries. Section 3 develops a simple theoretical framework
and illustrates analytically the mechanisms behind the key results of the paper. Section 4
presents the quantitative results based on a calibrated model of the world economy. Section 5
discusses robustness checks and results based on model perturbations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Facts
Figure 1a presents a scatterplot of log macroeconomic volatility against log country size for
a sample of 143 countries. Volatility is the standard deviation of the yearly growth rate of
real per capita GDP, while country size is the share of the country in world GDP.4 The
3Our work is complementary to the research agenda that studies the impact of rm dynamics on macroe-
conomic outcomes in 2-country IRBC models. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) use the heterogeneous rms model
to help account for the persistence of deviations from purchasing power parity, while Alessandria and Choi
(2007) and Ruhl (2008) evaluate the quantitative importance of rm entry and exit for aggregate trade
dynamics. An important dierence between these papers and our work is that these contributions examine
consequences of aggregate shocks, while in our paper all the shocks are at the rm level. In addition, our
work features multiple countries, and explains cross-sectional dierences in volatility between countries.
4Detailed variable denitions and sources for all the data in this section are described in Appendix A.
3Figure depicts the partial correlation between these two variables after netting out per capita
income, as it has been shown that high-income countries tend to experience lower volatility.
As established by Canning et al. (1998) and Furceri and Karras (2007) among others, smaller
countries are more volatile. The elasticity of volatility with respect to country size is about
 0:14 in this set of countries, and the relationship is highly signicant, with a t-statistic of
6.2.
Figure 1b presents the scatterplot of log macroeconomic volatility against log trade
openness (imports plus exports as a share of GDP), once again netting out per capita
income. There is a positive and signicant relationship: countries that trade more tend to
be more volatile, with a coecient of 0.33 and a t-statistic of 3.6. This empirical regularity
has been demonstrated in a cross section of countries by Easterly et al. (2001) and Kose et al.
(2003). The cross-country evidence is likely to be aected by reverse causality and omitted
variables problems. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) investigate the openness-volatility
relationship in great detail using industry-level data, which makes it possible to overcome
these econometric estimation concerns. They conrm that the relationship between trade
openness and macroeconomic volatility is indeed positive and economically signicant.
The analysis below focuses on the role of large rms in explaining these cross-country
patterns. Anecdotal evidence on the importance of large rms for aggregate uctuations
abounds. Here, we describe two examples in which the roles of country size and international
trade are especially evident. In New Zealand a single rm, Fonterra, is responsible for a full
one-third of global dairy exports (it is the world's single largest exporter of dairy products).
Such a large exporter from such a small country clearly matters for the macroeconomy.
Indeed, Fonterra's sales (95% of which are exports) account for 20% of New Zealand's
overall exports, and 7% of its GDP.5 Two points about this rm are worth noting. First,
international trade clearly plays a prominent role in making Fonterra as large as it is.
And second, the distribution of rm size in the dairy sector is indeed highly skewed. The
second largest producer of dairy products in New Zealand is 1.3% the size of Fonterra.
This phenomenon is not conned to commodity exporting countries. In Korea, a larger
manufacturing-based economy, the 10 biggest business groups account for 54% of GDP and
51% of total exports. Even among the top 10, the distribution of rm size and total exports
is extremely skewed. The largest one, Samsung, is responsible for 23% of exports and 14%
5It is important to note that GDP represents value added, and thus Fonterra's total sales are less than
7% of the total sales of all rms in New Zealand. However, because exports are recorded as total sales,
Fonterra's export sales are directly comparable to New Zealand's total exports. The same caveat applies to
the example that follows.
4of GDP (see Figure 2).6
Gabaix (2011) shows that aggregate volatility due to the idiosyncratic shocks to rms
is an increasing function of the Herndahl index of the rms' output shares. To produce
the country size-volatility relationship in Figure 1a through the shocks to large rms, it
must be the case that smaller countries have higher Herndahl indices of rm output {
they are less diversied. Figure 3a presents the partial correlations between the Herndahl
index of rm sales and country size, after netting out the impact of per capita income,
with all variables in natural logs.7 The gure also plots the OLS best t through the data,
along with the slope coecients, standard errors, and the R2's. The rm-level data used to
compute the Herndahl indices come from the ORBIS database described in Appendix A.
Because the number of rms covered by ORBIS varies substantially across countries, we
present the results for three samples: (i) all 134 countries for which it is possible to calculate
the Herndahl index in ORBIS data; (ii) the 81 countries with sales data for at least 100
rms; and (iii) the 52 countries with sales data for at least 1,000 rms. The countries with
dierent numbers of rms are labelled with dierent symbols. Figure 3a shows that the
relationship between the Herndahl index and country size is negative as expected, and
highly statistically signicant in all three samples.
The Herndahl index is the variable most directly relevant to the quantitative results
in the paper. However, because ideally it requires information on the entire rm size
distribution, the Herndahl index may also be most heavily inuenced by dierences in
coverage in the ORBIS database. Because of this, we also present the relationship of country
size to two other indicators of rm size: the combined sales of the 10 largest rms in the
country, and the size of the single largest rm. These indicators focus on the very largest
rms that are measured more reliably in the data, and thus the problems of coverage are less
severe. In addition, these empirical relationships capture a related feature of the data that
is crucial for evaluating the role of large rms for the country size-volatility relationship. A
bigger country could either have larger rms, or have more rms, than a smaller country.
Since these two possibilities have very dierent implications for how aggregate volatility
changes with country size, it is important for our model to match the relative size of the
largest rms in countries of dierent sizes. Figure 3b depicts the partial correlation between
the log size of the 10 largest rms and log country size, once again after netting out log per
6It turns out that the size distribution of rms is quite skewed even within business groups. For in-
stance, breaking Samsung down into its constituent rms reveals that the sales of Samsung Electronics
alone accounted for 7% of GDP and 15.5% of Korea's exports in 2006.




where k indexes rms, and h(k) is the share of rm k in total sales by all rms.
5capita income. The results are reported for all three ORBIS samples, as above. There is a
signicant positive relationship between the absolute size of the largest 10 rms and country
size: not surprisingly, larger countries have bigger rms, with an elasticity slightly below 1.
The slope coecient and the t are both quite stable across the samples. Figure 3c reports
the analogous relationship for the size of the single largest rm in each country, with quite
similar conclusions.
3 Theoretical Framework
This section lays out a simplied analytical framework to illustrate the main mechanisms
behind the results. The quantitative investigation based on a more complete model follows
in Section 4. The full description of the equations dening the complete model is presented
in Appendix B.
The minimalist framework that can be used to model the role of rms in the relationship
between country size and volatility has to feature: (i) a rm size distribution that can
be matched to the data; (ii) endogenous determination of the set of rms operating in
equilibrium; and (iii) idiosyncratic shocks to rms. In addition, to investigate the role of
international trade, the model must have (iv) an export participation decision by rms.
3.1 The Environment
Consider a model in the spirit of Melitz (2003), but with a discrete number of goods as
in Krugman (1980). The world is comprised of C countries, indexed by i;j = 1;:::;C. In
country i, buyers (who could be nal consumers or rms purchasing intermediate inputs)
maximize a standard CES objective over the set of Ji varieties available in country i. It is






where " is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, xi(k) is the quantity of good
k demanded in country i, pi(k) is the price of this good, Xi is total expenditure in the








There is one factor of production, labor, with country endowments given by Lj, j =
1;:::;C, and wages denoted by wj. Production uses both labor and intermediate inputs. In
6particular, a rm with unit input requirement a must use a input bundles to produce one






There are both xed and variable costs of production and trade. The timing in the
economy is depicted in Figure 4. At the beginning of the period each potential producer
of variety k = 1;:::;  Ij in each j = 1;:::;C must pay an \exploration" cost fe in order to
become an entrepreneur. Upon paying this cost, entrepreneur k discovers her productivity,
indexed by a unit input requirement a(k), and faces downward-sloping demand for her
unique variety given by (1). On the basis of this draw, each entrepreneur in country j
decides whether to operate and which markets to serve. To start serving market i from
country j, a rm must pay a xed cost fij, and an iceberg per-unit cost of ij > 1 (with jj
normalized to 1). Having paid the xed costs of entering these markets, the rm learns the
realization of a transitory shock z(k), i.i.d. across rms. Once all of the uncertainty has
been realized, each rm produces with a unit input requirement a(k)z(k), markets clear,
and consumption takes place.8
If a rm from country j decides to sell to country i, its prot-maximizing price is a
constant markup over marginal cost pi(k) = "
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: (3)
Because of xed costs of serving a market, there is a cuto unit input requirement aij
above which rms in country j do not serve market i, dened as the level of a(k) = aij such
that the expected prots in equation (3) equal zero. To go forward with the analysis, we
make the following two assumptions:
8Note that the assumption on the timing of events, namely that the decision to enter markets takes place
before z(k) is realized, implies that the realization of the rm-specic transitory shock does not aect the
equilibrium number of rms in each market. This simplication lets us analyze the equilibrium production
allocation as an approximation around a case in which the variance of z is zero. That is, we abstract from the
extensive margin of exports, and entry and exit of rms in response to transitory shocks. This simplication
delivers substantial analytical convenience, while it is unlikely to aect the results. This is because the focus
of the paper is on the role of the largest rms in generating aggregate volatility, and the largest rms are
inframarginal: their entry decision will be unaected by the realization of the transitory shock. Note also
that this timing assumption implies that our analytical approach is akin to the common one of analyzing
the response to shocks in deviations from a non-stochastic steady state.
7Assumption 1 The marginal rm is small enough that it ignores the impact of its own re-
alization of z(k) on the total expenditure Xi and the price level Pi in all potential destination
markets i = 1;:::;C.
Assumption 2 The marginal rm treats Xi and Pi as xed (non-stochastic).
The rst assumption is not controversial, and has been made in the literature since Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980). The second assumption allows us to take Xi and Pi
outside of the expectation operator. It amounts to assuming that the entrepreneur ignores
the volatility of aggregate output and the price level when deciding to enter a market.9
Under these two assumptions, setting (3) to zero and taking the expectation over z, the
















The equilibrium number of potential entrepreneurs  Ij is pinned down by the familiar free
entry condition in each country. Entrepreneurs will enter until the expected prot equals


















for each country j, where 1[] is the indicator function.
Closing the model involves nding expressions for aij, Pi, wi, and  Ii for all i;j = 1;:::;C.
As an approximation, we solve for the equilibrium production allocation and price levels
9It is important to emphasize that these are assumptions placed on the behavior of the marginal en-
trepreneur. They allow us to compute the cutos for production and exporting aij as if the model was
non-stochastic. This delivers substantial analytical and computational simplicity without aecting any of
the main conclusions, since in our model the economy is dominated by very large rms, and thus the marginal
ones are not important for the aggregate outcomes. On the other hand, one may question our assumption
about the behavior of the largest rms, namely that markups are a constant multiple of marginal cost. If
the largest rms in the economy are so large that their pricing decisions can aect the price level, their
prot-maximizing prices will depart from the simple Dixit-Stiglitz constant markup benchmark. Note that
qualitatively, this critique applies to all implementations of the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, and their exten-
sions to heterogeneous rms. It is ultimately a quantitative question how much this force matters (Yang and
Heijdra, 1993; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1993). While the full solution of our model under exible markups would
be impractical, and to our knowledge has not yet been implemented in this type of large-scale setting, we
can perform a simple simulation that assesses the quantitative importance of allowing for variable markups
in this setting. The Supplementary Web Appendix describes the exercise in detail, and shows that quanti-
tatively, the deviations of exible-markup prices from the constant-markup benchmark are very small even
for the largest rms in small countries.
8ignoring rm-specic transitory shocks. Taking the expectations over a(k) and z(k), and
using the fact that Ez
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We make the standard distributional assumption on productivity:
Assumption 3 Firm productivity 1=a follows a Pareto(b;) distribution: Pr(1=a < y) =
1   (b=y)
, where b is the minimum value labor productivity can take, and  regulates dis-
persion.
Using the distributional assumption to compute the cdf's and conditional expectations over


































The model is closed by assuming balanced trade in each country, which delivers a system of
equations dening the vector of equilibrium wages wi. The denition of equilibrium and the
set of equilibrium conditions for the complete 2-sector model are laid out in Appendix B.
In the remainder of this section, we use the relationships implied by the simple model above
to illustrate the main mechanisms behind our results.
3.2 Power Law in Firm Size and Aggregate Volatility in the Model and
the Data





where I is the total number of operating rms, x(a(k);z(k)) is the sales of rm k, and we
omit the country subscripts. Appendix C shows that the standard deviation of the growth












k=1 h(k)2 is the Herndahl index of production shares of rms in this economy,
and  is the standard deviation of the growth rate of sales of an individual rm. This is
9the familiar expression for the standard deviation of a sum of random variables, and is the
same as the one used by Gabaix (2011).10
This economy is granular, that is, idiosyncratic shocks to rms result in aggregate
uctuations, if the distribution of rm size follows a power law with an exponent suciently
close to 1 in absolute value. Firm sales x in the economy must conform to
Pr(x > q) = q ; (10)
where  is close to 1. Gabaix (2011, Proposition 2) shows that when the rm size distribution
follows a power law with an exponent  , the economy is populated by N rms, and each
rm has a standard deviation of sales growth equal to , the aggregate volatility given by
(9) is proportional to =N 1 1= for 1 <  < 2, and to =logN when  = 1. This result
means that when  < 2 and thus the distribution of rm size has innite variance, the
conventional Law of Large Numbers does not apply, and aggregate volatility decays in the
number of rms N only very slowly. In other words, under nite variance in the rm size
distribution, aggregate volatility decays at rate
p
N in the number of rms. But under
Zipf's Law { dened as   1 { it decays only at rate logN.
In this paper, we take this statistical result for granted. This section relates it to our
theoretical framework by rst demonstrating how the parameters of the model can be cali-
brated to the observed distribution of rm size. Then, we discuss the two key comparative
statics: the role of country size and the role of trade openness in aggregate volatility.
It turns out that the baseline Melitz-Pareto model delivers a power law in rm size. We
demonstrate the power law in an autarkic economy, and then discuss how the distribution
of rm size is aected by international trade. In our model, the expected sales of a rm as
a function of its unit input requirement are: x(a) = Da1 ", where the constant D reects
the size of domestic demand, and we drop the sector and country subscripts. Under the
assumption that 1=a Pareto(b;), the power law follows:





















" 1 and  = 
" 1. This relationship is depicted in Figure 5.
Thus, our model economy will be granular if 
" 1 is close enough to 1 { the power law
exponent in the data (see, among others, Axtell, 2001; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010;
di Giovanni et al., 2011).
10Note that there are no aggregate shocks in the model, only the rm-specic idiosyncratic shocks.
10Gabaix (2011) shows that although aggregate volatility decays in the number of rms
much more slowly than under the conventional LLN, countries with a greater number of
rms N will nonetheless have lower aggregate volatility. This forms the basis of the relation-
ship between country size and aggregate volatility. As has been understood since Krugman
(1980), larger countries { those with higher L in our model { will feature a larger number
of rms in equilibrium. Thus, they can be expected to have lower aggregate volatility. This
can be demonstrated most transparently in the autarky equilibrium. Setting the number of
countries C = 1 and using the Pareto distributional assumption, equation (5) can be used
to compute the production cuto aaut consistent with free entry. With zero net aggregate
prots, the total expenditure in the economy is equal to X = L=, where we set the wage
to be the num eraire. Equations (4) and (7) then imply that the equilibrium number of
entrants  Iaut is proportional to:






This is the well-known result that the number of rms increases in country size, measured
by L. It is immediate that without input-output linkages ( = 1), the relationship is simply
linear.11 The presence of input-output linkages actually tends to raise this elasticity above 1:
as long as " > 1, the number of rms responds more than proportionately to the increase
in market size. The condition that " > 1 is akin to the \no black hole" assumption
(Fujita et al., 2001). When it is violated, increasing returns are so strong that countries
with higher L actually have a smaller number of entrants. We impose the restriction that
" > 1 throughout. It is likely to be comfortably satised in the data, as available estimates
put  in the range of 0.5, while " is typically assumed to be around 6 (see Section 4.1 for
details).12 Equilibrium relationship (11) combined with Zipf's Law in rm size thus forms
the basis for the rst main result of the paper: smaller countries will have fewer rms, and
thus higher aggregate volatility.
3.3 International Trade and Aggregate Volatility
How does international trade aect the distribution of rm size and therefore aggregate
volatility? As rst demonstrated by Melitz (2003), the distribution of rm size becomes






12One may wonder whether the larger number of number of entrants  I actually translates into a larger
number of operating rms, since not all entrants decide to produce. The number of operating rms is given
by  IautG(aaut), where G() is the cdf of a. The solution to aaut does not depend on L in this model, and
thus the number of actual operating rms is linear in  Iaut.
11more unequal under trade: compared to autarky, the least productive rms exit, and only
the most productive rms export abroad. Due to competition from foreign varieties, domes-
tic sales and prots decrease. Thus, as a country opens to trade, sales of most rms shrink,
while the largest rms grow larger as a result of exporting.13 Figure 5 depicts this eect.
In the two-country case, there is a single productivity cuto, above which rms export
abroad. Compared to autarky, there is a higher probability of nding larger rms above
this cuto. In the C-country case, with multiple export markets there will be cutos for
each market, with progressively more productive rms exporting to more and more markets
and growing larger and larger relative to domestic GDP. Thus, if the distribution of rm
sales follows a power law and the economy is granular, international trade has the potential
to increase the size of the largest rms, in eect creating a \hyper-granular" economy, with
clear implications for the relationship between trade openness and aggregate volatility. All
else equal, this \selection into exporting" eect implies that after trade opening, aggregate
volatility increases.
Before moving on to the quantitative assessment of the relationships between country
size, international trade, and volatility illustrated above, we allude to another mechanism
through which trade can aect volatility in a model with free entry. When a country
opens to trade, the possibility of getting a suciently high productivity draw and becoming
an exporter induces more potential entrepreneurs to enter and draw their productivity:  I
rises. To demonstrate this eect in the simplest possible way, we assume that countries are
symmetric: Li = L, fii = f 8i, and ij = , fij = fX 8i;j. Under trade, the number of
13Firm-level studies of dynamic adjustment to trade liberalization appear to nd empirical support for
these predictions. Pavcnik (2002) provides evidence that trade liberalization led to a shift in resources from
the least to the most productive rms in Chile. Bernard et al. (2003) show that a fall in trade costs leads
to both exit by the least productive rms and entry by rms into export markets. In addition, existing
exporters ship more abroad. A recent contribution by Holmes and Stevens (2010) shows that in the U.S.,
in some sectors the large rms are the ones suering the most from foreign competition, because smaller
rms are highly specialized boutique operations that are less aected by imports than the large factories
producing standardized products with close foreign substitutes. The point made by Holmes and Stevens
(2010) is a very important one, but it can be thought of as one about industrial classication: large factories
and boutique ones produce dierent types of goods, which face very dierent market structures { competitive
environments, trade costs, and so on. This comes through most clearly in the modeling approach adopted
in that paper, in which it classies the small boutique producers as nontradeable. Thus, the Holmes and
Stevens (2010) nding can be easily reconciled with our complete two-sector model, described in Appendix B
and used in the quantitative analysis, by assuming that the standardized producers are part of the tradeable
sector, while the boutique producers are part of the non-tradeable sector. Indeed, this is very close to the
assumption that Holmes and Stevens (2010) actually adopt in their model.
12entrants is equal to
 Itrade =
2
















It is linear in  Iaut, and thus trade opening increases the number of entrants relative to
autarky, since the term in the square brackets is larger than 1. Because aggregate volatility
decreases in the number of rms, this \net entry" eect will tend to decrease volatility when
a country opens to trade, as long as " > 1.
As we demonstrate below, however, this eect is quite small quantitatively. The impact
of international trade on aggregate volatility is virtually the same whether we allow new net
entry after opening or not. To see why this is the case, note that at reasonable parameter
values, the exponent on the \trade term" { the square bracket in equation (12) { is quite
small, and thus the change in  I from autarky to trade is modest. Furthermore, even if
the number of operating rms increases by as much as the dierence between  Iaut and
 Itrade, this eect alone would amount to a proportional reduction in volatility of only 1  
  Itrade= Iaut
1 1=, which is very small if  is close to 1 { i.e. if the rm size distribution
follows Zipf's Law.
As a back of the envelope calculation, we could evaluate the reduction in volatility due
to the net entry eect alone by plugging in the parameter values for , f, fX, , ", and 
from the quantitative model below (see Section 4.1 and Table 1). It turns out that with 100
symmetric countries (each thus accounting for 1% of world GDP),  Itrade= Iaut = 1:21, which
alone would imply a reduction in aggregate volatility of only 0.9% compared to autarky.
With 200 countries (each 0.5% of world GDP), the reduction is 1.4%. These are upper
bounds, because the number of actual operating rms will increase by less than the term
in brackets in (12), as the production cutos will also become more stringent under trade.
While the baseline quantitative exercise below retains the free entry assumption, Sec-
tion 5 presents the results under xed  I's, conrming the conclusion of the back of the
envelope calculation: changes in net entry play only a minor role in the impact of trade on
volatility.
4 Quantitative Evidence
Though the analytical results obtained with symmetric countries in a one-sector model are
informative, we would like to exploit the rich heterogeneity among the countries in the
world. In order to do this, we numerically implement the general multi-country model laid
13out in Section 3, extended to include a non-traded sector with intermediate input linkages
both within and between sectors. Since only the minority of economic activity takes place
in sectors with substantial cross-border trade, including an explicitly non-traded sector in
the quantitative exercise is especially important for evaluating the impact of changes in
trade costs on volatility.
In particular, suppose that in each country there are two broad sectors, the tradeable
T and the non-tradeable N. Consumer preferences are Cobb-Douglas in CES aggregates
of N and T, with the share of N in nal expenditure equal to . Intermediate inputs are
also Cobb-Douglas in the N and T aggregates, with the share of N equal to s in sector
s = N;T. The share of labor in total spending on inputs, s, will also now vary by sector.
The rest of the model remains unchanged. Appendix B presents the complete description
of the equations dening the equilibrium in the two-sector model.
4.1 Calibration
We numerically implement the economy under the following parameter values (see Table 1
for a summary). The elasticity of substitution is "s = 6. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
report available estimates of this elasticity to be in the range of 3 to 10, and we pick a
value close to the middle of the range. The key parameter is s, as it governs the slope of
the power law. As described above, in this model rm sales follow a power law with the
exponent equal to s
"s 1. In the data, rm sales follow a power law with the exponent close
to 1. Axtell (2001) reports the value of 1.06, which we use to nd s given our preferred
value of "s: s = 1:06  ("s   1) = 5:3. We set both the elasticity of substitution and
the Pareto exponent to be the same in the N and the T sectors. Appendix Section B.1
justies in detail the calibration of the two-sector model parameters to the observed rm
size distributions.
We set the share of non-tradeables in consumption  = 0:65. This is the mean value
of services value added in total value added in the database compiled by the Groningen
Growth and Development Center and extended to additional countries by Yi and Zhang
(2010). It is the value also adopted by Alvarez and Lucas (2007). The values of N and T {
share of labor/value added in total output { are calibrated using the 1997 U.S. Benchmark
Input-Output Table. We take the Detailed Make and Use tables, featuring more than 400
distinct sectors, and aggregate them into a 2-sector Direct Requirements Table. This table
gives the amount of N, T, and factor inputs required to produce a unit of nal output. Thus,
s is equal to the share of total sector s output that is not used to pay for intermediate
14inputs, i.e., the payments to factors of production. According to the U.S. Input-Output
Matrix, N = 0:65 and T = 0:35: the traded sector is considerably more input-intensive
than the non-traded sector. The shares of non-traded and traded inputs in both sectors
are also calibrated based on the U.S. I-O Table. According to the data, more than 75%
of the inputs used in the N sector come from the N sector itself (N = 0:77), while only
35% of T-sector inputs are non-tradeable (T = 0:35). Nonetheless, these values still leave
substantial room for cross-sectoral input-output linkages.
To calibrate the values of ij for each pair of countries we use the gravity estimates from
the empirical model of Helpman et al. (2008). To take a stand on the values of fs
ii and fs
ij,
we follow di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) and use the information on entry costs from
the Doing Business Indicators database (The World Bank, 2007a). The data sources and
the details of the calibration of ij and fs
ij are described in Appendix A.
Finally, we set the value of the \exploration cost" fe such that the equilibrium number
of operating rms in the U.S. is equal to 7 million. According to the 2002 U.S. Economic
Census, there were 6,773,632 establishments with a payroll in the United States. There
are an additional 17,646,062 business entities that are not employers, but they account for
less than 3.5% of total shipments. Thus, while the U.S. may have many more legal entities
than what we assume here, 7 million is a number suciently high as to let us consider
consequences of granularity. Since we do not have information on the total number of rms
in other countries, we choose to set fe to be the same in all countries. In the absence of
data, this is the most agnostic approach we could take. In addition, since fe represents the
cost of nding out one's abilities, we do not expect it to be aected by policies and thus
dier across countries. The resulting value of fe is 15 times higher than fs
US;US, and 2.4
times higher than the average fs
ii in the rest of the sample. The nding that the ex-ante
xed cost of learning one's type is much higher than the ex-post xed cost of production is
common in the quantitative models of this type (see, e.g., Ghironi and Melitz, 2005).
We carry out the analysis on the sample of the largest 49 countries by total GDP, plus
the 50th that represents the rest of the world. These 49 countries together cover 97% of
world GDP. We exclude the entrep^ ot economies of Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which
have total trade well in excess of their GDP due to signicant re-exporting activity. Thus,
our model is not intended to t these countries. (We do place them into the rest-of-the-world
category.) The country sample, sorted by total GDP, is reported in Table 2.
154.2 Model Solution and Simulation Method
In order to solve the model numerically, we must nd the wages and price indices for each
country, wi, PN
i , PT
i , that satisfy equations (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3), jointly with the values
of  IN
i and  IT
i that satisfy equations (5) for each sector. The system is non-reducible, such
that all of the prices and numbers of entrants must be solved simultaneously. Note that
in this step the equilibrium values are computed under the assumption that the model
aggregates take on their expected values. That is, this step ignores any variation in Ps
i 's,
 Is
i 's, and as
ij's that would arise from one random draw of a vector of a's to another { a
common approach in monopolistic competition models.
Using the equilibrium equations and the chosen the parameter values, we can solve the
full model for a given vector of Li. For nding the values of Li, we follow the approach of
Alvarez and Lucas (2007). First, we would like to think of Li not as population per se, but
as \equipped labor," to take explicit account of TFP and capital endowment dierences
between countries. To obtain the values of Li that are internally consistent in the model,
we start with an initial guess for Li for all i = 1;:::;C, and use it to solve the full model.
Given the solution for wages, we update our guess for Li for each country in order to match
the GDP ratio between each country i and the U.S.. Using the resulting values of Li, we
solve the model again to obtain the new set of wages, and iterate to convergence (for more
on this approach, see Alvarez and Lucas, 2007). Thus, our procedure generates vectors wi
and Li in such a way as to match exactly the relative total GDPs of the countries in the
sample. In practice, the results are close to simply equating Li to the relative GDPs. In
this procedure, we must normalize the population of one of the countries. We thus set LUS
to its actual value of 291 million as of 2003, and compute Li of every other country relative
to this U.S. value. An important consequence of this approach is that countries with higher
TFP and capital abundance will tend to have a greater number of potential productivity
draws  Is
i , all else equal, since our procedure will eectively give them a higher Li. This is
akin to the assumption adopted by Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Chaney (2008) that the
number of productivity draws is a constant multiple of equipped labor Li. The dierence in
our approach is that though we take labor-cum-productivity to be the measure of market
size, we solve for  IN
i and  IT
i endogenously within the model.
Having solved the model given the data on country GDPs and trade costs, we now
simulate it using random productivity draws for each rm in each economy. Namely, in
each country i and sector s we draw  Is
i productivities from a Pareto(bs,s) distribution. For
each rm, we use the cutos as
ji for serving each market j (including its own market j = i)
16given by equation (4) to determine whether the rm operates, and which, if any, foreign
markets it serves. We next calculate the total sales of each rm as the sum of its sales in
each market it serves, and compute the Herndahl index of rm sales in country i. Since
the distribution of rm productivities gives rise to a highly skewed distribution of rm sales,
there is variation in the Herndahl index from simulation to simulation, even though we
draw as many as 7 million operating rms in a given country { note that this number is the
total for the N and T sectors, where we take independent draws for each sector. We thus
repeat the exercise 1001 times, and take the median values of the Herndahl index in each
country. In parallel, we also compute the Herndahl index of rm sales in autarky for each
country, which will allow us to gauge the contribution of international trade to aggregate
volatility. Given these values of the Herndahl index h, we can then construct each country's
aggregate volatility under trade and in autarky using the formula for the standard deviation
of aggregate output growth (9) and a realistic value of . Following Gabaix (2011), we set
 = 0:1, although since in this paper we will not exploit any variation in  across countries,
none of the results will be driven by this choice.
4.3 Model Fit
We assess the model t along three dimensions: (i) overall and bilateral trade volumes; (ii)
the relationship between country size and the size of the largest rms in each country; and
(iii) the share of exporting rms in the economy.
Figure 6a reports the scatterplot of bilateral trade ratios, ij = Xij=wiLi. Note that
since in the data we only have bilateral trade as a share of GDP, not of total sales, we
compute the same object in the model. This captures both the distinction between trade,
which is recorded as total value, and GDP, which is recorded as value added; as well as
the fact that there is a large non-traded sector in both the model and in the data. On
the horizontal axis is the natural logarithm of ij that comes from the model, while on the
vertical axis is the corresponding value of that bilateral trade ow in the data. Hollow dots
represent exports from one country to another, ij, i 6= j. Solid dots, at the top of the
scatterplot, represent sales of domestic rms as a share of domestic absorption, ii. For
convenience, we add a 45-degree line. It is clear that the trade volumes implied by the model
match the actual data well. Most observations are quite close to the 45-degree line. It is
especially important that we get the variation in the overall trade openness (1   ii) right,
since that will drive the contribution of trade to the aggregate volatility in each country.
Figure 6b plots the actual values of (1 ii) against those implied by the model, along with
17a 45-degree line. We can see that although the relationship is not perfect, it is quite close.
Table 3 compares the means and medians of ii and ij's for the model and the data,
and reports the correlations between the two. The correlation between domestic shares ii
calculated from the model and those in the data for this sample of countries is around 0.48.
The correlation between export shares, ij, is actually higher at 0.78.14 Since we use esti-
mated gravity coecients together with the actual data on bilateral country characteristics
to compute trade costs, it is not surprising that our model ts bilateral trade data quite
well given the success of the empirical gravity relationship. Nonetheless, since the gravity
estimates we use come from outside of our calibration procedure, it is important to check
that our model delivers outcomes similar to observed trade volumes.
We next assess whether the model reproduces the relationships between country size and
the relevant features of the rm size distributions demonstrated in Figure 3. In the data, log
country size is negatively and signicantly related to the log Herndahl index of rm sales;
and positively and signicantly related to the size of the 10 largest rms and the size of the
largest rm in the economy. We can compare the data to the same relationships inside our
model. It turns out that in the model the elasticity of the Herndahl index with respect to
country size of  0:135, which is right in between the Herndahl-country size elasticity of
 0:114 (sample of countries with more than 1000 rms) and  0:284 (sample of countries
with more than 100 rms) in Figure 3a. Turning to the size of the largest rms, our model
produces an elasticity of the 10 largest rms to country size of 0.903, and of the single
largest rm to country size of 0.908. These match almost perfectly the range of elasticities
produced by the data: 0.888 to 1.006 for the 10 largest rms (Figure 3b), and 0.838 to
0.906 (Figure 3c) for the single largest rm. We conclude that overall, the predictions of
the model regarding these aspects of the rm size distribution across countries match fairly
well the patterns observed in the data.
Finally, we use the model solution to calculate the percentage of rms that export
in the total economy, as well as in the tradeable sector. In particular, the total number
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N. We would like to compare the export participation shares in the
14We also experimented with increasing the number of countries in the simulation to 60. The model ts
the data well, but there are more zeros in bilateral trade data in the 60-country sample compared to the
50-country one. (With 50 countries, among the 2500 possible unidirectional bilateral trade ows, only 18
are zeros.) Since our model does not generate zero bilateral trade outcomes, we stick with the largest 49
countries in our analysis.
18model to what is found in the data. Unfortunately, there is no systematic empirical evidence
on these shares across countries (and time). However, we have examined available data and
existing literature and found these shares for 8 countries: U.S., Germany, France, Argentina,
Colombia, Ireland, Chile, and New Zealand. Table 4 compares the export participation
shares produced by the model to those found in the data in this subset of countries. The
rst two columns report the values in the model, with the shares of exporters relative to all
the rms in the economy in column 1 and in the tradeable sector only in column 2. Data
sources dier across countries, in particular the shares of exporting rms are sometimes
reported only relative to all rms in the economy (which we record in column 3), and
sometimes relative to all the rms in the tradeable sector (which we record in column 4).
Thus, data in column 3 should be compared to model outcomes in column 1, while data in
column 4 should be compared to model outcomes in column 2.
It is clear from this table that the model produces quite reasonable results. Larger
countries tend to have fewer exporters relative to the overall number of rms (compare
U.S. to Colombia); countries closer to large markets tend to have higher shares of exporters
compared to faraway countries (compare Ireland to New Zealand). In most cases the model
implied value is close to the data. We should note that by making ad hoc adjustments
to trade costs in individual countries, we can match each and every one of these numbers
exactly. We do not do so because this information is not available systematically for every
country in our sample, and because the available rm-level data themselves are noisy. In-
stead, we take trade costs as implied by a basic gravity model, and the variation in xed
costs as implied by the Doing Business Indicators, an approach that is rather straightfor-
ward and does not involve any manual second-guessing. And yet, our model gets the rough
values and orders of magnitude more or less right for a number of dierent countries.
4.4 Main Results: Country Size and Trade Openness
As would be expected, the level of aggregate volatility in the model is lower than what is
observed in the data, since in the model all volatility comes from idiosyncratic shocks to
rms. Column 1 of Table 5 reports the ratio of the aggregate volatility implied by the model
to the actual GDP volatility found in the data. It ranges between 0.14 and 0.72, with a
value of 0.377 for the United States, almost identical to what Gabaix (2011) nds using
a very dierent methodology. Note that the variation in aggregate volatility in the model
across countries is generated by dierences in country size as well as variation in bilateral
trade costs.
19How well can the model reproduce the empirical relationship between aggregate volatility
and country size? Figure 7 plots volatility as a function of country size in the data and the
model. Note that since the level of aggregate volatility in the model does not match up
with the level in the data, this graph is only informative about the comparison of slopes,
not intercepts. In the data the elasticity of GDP volatility with respect to country size is
 0:139 (GDP) in this sample of countries. Table A1 reports the results of estimating the
volatility-size relationship in the data for various country samples and with and without
controls. The baseline coecient used in Figure 7 comes from the 50-country sample and
controlling for income per capita. Our calibrated model produces an elasticity of  0:135
(T), which is extremely close to the one in the data though slightly below it in absolute
terms.
We now assess the contribution of international trade to aggregate volatility in our
sample of countries. Our model yields not only the predicted aggregate volatility in the
simulated trade equilibrium, but also the aggregate volatility in autarky. As a preview of
the results on the impact of trade openness, Figure 7 reports the volatility-size relationship in
autarky. Without trade this relationship is somewhat atter: the elasticity of volatility with
respect to country size in autarky is  0:115 (A), lower than the  0:139 in the data. Thus,
it appears that openness helps the model match the slope of the size-volatility relationship:
without trade, smaller countries would be less volatile than they actually are.
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the ratio of the volatility under the current trade regime to
the volatility in autarky in each country in the sample. In the table, countries are ranked by
size in descending order. We can see that international trade contributes very little to overall
GDP volatility in the U.S.. The country is so large and trade volumes are so low (relative
to total output) that its volatility under trade is only 1.035 times higher than it would be
in complete absence of trade. Similar results obtain for other very large economies, such as
Japan and China. By contrast, smaller, centrally located countries experience substantially
higher volatility compared to autarky. For instance, in a country like Romania, the volatility
under trade is some 22 percent higher than it would be in autarky, and in Turkey, Denmark,
and Norway it is 14-16% higher. In between are small, but remote countries. South Africa,
Argentina, and New Zealand experience aggregate volatility that is about 10% higher than
it would have been in autarky.
Finally, we investigate how well the model predicts the actual GDP volatility found
in the data. Table 6 presents regressions of actual volatility of per capita GDP growth
over the period 1970-2006 against the one predicted by the model (T), with all variables
20in natural logs. Column 1 includes no controls. The relationship is positive and highly
signicant. The t of this simple bivariate relationship is remarkably high (R2 = 0:353),
given that in the model variation in T is driven only by country size, trade barriers,
and xed costs. The model uses no information on any type of aggregate shocks (TFP,
monetary, or scal policy), or any other country characteristics that have been shown to be
shown to correlate with macroeconomic volatility, such as per capita income, institutions,
or industrial specialization. The second column includes GDP per capita. The t of the
model improves slightly, and though the coecient on the model volatility is somewhat
smaller, it remains signicant at the 1% level. The next two columns include measures
of export structure volatility and sectoral specialization, since di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2009, 2011) show that opening to trade can impact aggregate volatility through changes
in these variables. Column 3 adds the risk content of exports, which captures the overall
riskiness of a country's export structure.15 The model volatility remains signicant, and the
R2 of the regression is now 0.477. Finally, the fourth column adds a measure of production
specialization for the manufacturing sector (Herndahl of sectoral production shares).16
The number of observations drops to 35 due to limited data availability, but the model
volatility still remains signicant.
5 Robustness Checks and Model Perturbations
5.1 Free Entry and Intermediate Inputs
The assumption that the number of potential projects is determined by a free entry condition
may not be realistic. We argued in Section 3.3 that when evaluating the impact of trade
opening, the free entry assumption is unlikely to matter much for the results. We conrm
this conjecture by simulating the quantitative model under the assumption that the numbers
of potential entrepreneurs  Is
i is xed in every country and sector.17
Table 7 reports the results of this robustness check. For ease of comparison, the top
row presents the two main results from the baseline analysis. The rst is that the model
generates higher volatility in smaller countries, with the elasticity of volatility with respect
to country size of  0:135. (As reported above, in the data this elasticity is very close,
15This measure is taken from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2011). A country's export structure can be
volatile due to a lack of diversication and/or exporting in sectors that are more volatile.
16This measure is calculated using the UNIDO database of sectoral production, and is taken from di Gio-
vanni and Levchenko (2009).
17We set the values of  I
s
i to be the same as in the free entry baseline, and adjust fii to match the 7 million
operating rms in the U.S. in the trade equilibrium; the results are virtually the same if we instead adopt
the common ad hoc assumption that  I
s
i are some constant fraction of Li, as in Chaney (2008), for instance.
21 0:139.) The second key result of the paper is the contribution of trade openness to
aggregate volatility. Column 2 reports the mean ratio of aggregate volatility under the
current level of trade openness relative to complete autarky.
Row 2 of Table 7 reports these two main results of the paper under the alternative
assumption that  Is
i is xed. Not surprisingly, the elasticity of volatility with respect to
country size is virtually identical. Less obviously, the xed- Is
i model delivers very similar
changes in volatility due to trade openness: the mean impact is 9.0%, compared to 9.7%
with free entry.
A somewhat related question is what is the role of intermediate input linkages. With
intermediate inputs, trade opening reduces the costs of the input bundle faced by rms,
making it easier to enter markets, all alse equal. To assess the importance of this eect,
we implement the baseline model with free entry but without intermediate input linkages:
T = N = 1. The two main results are presented in the third row of Table 7. The elasticity
of volatility with respect to country size is only slightly larger than in the baseline, at  0:145.
The impact of trade on volatility is much larger, at 23.8%.
5.2 Volatility Varying with Firm Size
An assumption that simplies the analysis above is that the volatility of the proportional
change in sales, , does not change in rm size x. If the volatility of sales decreases
suciently fast in rm size, larger rms will be so much less volatile that they will not impact
aggregate volatility. In fact, an economy in which larger rms are just agglomerations of
smaller units each subject to i.i.d. shocks is not granular: shocks to rms cannot generate
aggregate uctuations.
In practice, however, the negative relationship between rm size and its sales volatility
is not very strong. Several papers estimate the relationship between size and volatility of
the type  = Ax  using Compustat data (see, e.g., Stanley et al., 1996; Sutton, 2002).
The benchmark case in which larger rms are simply collections of independent smaller
rms would imply a value of  = 1=2, and the absence of granular uctuations. Instead,
the typical estimate of this parameter is about 1/6, implying that larger rms are not
substantially less volatile than smaller ones.18 Gabaix (2011) argues that these estimates
18A related point concerns multi-product rms: if large rms sell multiple imperfectly correlated products,
then the volatility of the total sales for multi-product rms will be lower than the volatility of single-product
rms. Evidence suggests, however, that even in multi-product rms the bulk of sales and exports is accounted
for by a single product line. Sutton (2002) provides evidence that in large corporations, the constituent
business units themselves follow a power law, with just a few very large business units and many much
smaller ones. Along similar lines, Adalet (2009) shows that in the census of New Zealand rms, only about
22may not be reliable, since they are obtained using only data on the largest listed rms. In
addition, it is not clear whether estimates based on the U.S. accurately reect the experience
of other countries. Hence, our baseline analysis sets  = 0, and a value of  based on the
largest 100 listed rms in the U.S.. In other words, we assume that all rms in the economy
experience volatility as low as the largest rms in the economy.
To check robustness of our results, we allow the rm-specic volatility to decrease in














where, once again, x(k) is sales of rm k, while h(k) is the share of rm k's sales in total
output in the economy.
The rest of the simulation remains unchanged. Since we are not matching the level of
aggregate volatility, just the role of country size and trade, we do not need to posit a value
of the constant A. However, it would be easy to calibrate to match the volatility of the top
100 rms in the U.S. as reported by Gabaix (2011), for example. Note that compared to the
baseline simulation, modelling a decreasing relationship between country size and volatility
is a double-edged sword: while larger rms may be less volatile as a result, smaller rms are
actually more volatile. This implies that the impact of either country size or international
trade will not necessarily be more muted when we make this modication to the basic
model.
Row 4 of Table 7 reports the two main results of the paper under the alternative as-
sumption that rm volatility decreases with rm size. In turns out that in this case, smaller
countries are even more volatile relative to large ones (the size-volatility elasticity doubles to
 0:286), and the contribution of trade is also larger, with trade leading to an average 29%
increase in volatility, compared to 9.7% in the baseline. Somewhat surprisingly, therefore,
allowing volatility to decrease in rm size implies a larger contribution of trade to aggregate
volatility, not a smaller one. In fact, this is the case in every country in the sample save the
U.S..19
6.5% to 9.5% of sales variation is explained by the extensive margin (more products per rm), with the rest
explained by the intensive margin (greater sales per product).
19Another possible determinant of rm volatility that would be relevant to our analysis is exporting.
The baseline model assumes that the volatility of a rm's sales growth does not change when it becomes an
exporter. If exporters became systematically more or less volatile than non-exporters, the quantitative results
could be aected. To check for this possibility, we used the Compustat Quarterly database of listed U.S.
rms together with information on whether a rm is an exporter from the Compustat Segments database.
235.3 Alternative Parameter Values
We assess the sensitivity of the results in two additional ways. The rst is an alternative
assumption on the curvature of the rm size distribution. Eaton et al. (2011) estimate a
range of values for =(" 1) of between 1.5 and 2.5. Though Gabaix (2011) shows that the
shocks to large rms can still generate aggregate volatility when the power law exponent is
less than 2, it is important to check whether the main results of our paper survive under
alternative values of =(" 1). Row 5 of Table 7 presents the two main results of the paper
under the assumption that the slope of the power law in rm size is 1.5 instead of 1.06.
Though in each case the numbers are slightly smaller in absolute value, the main qualitative
and quantitative results remain unchanged: smaller countries still have lower volatility, with
elasticity of  0:123, and trade contributes slightly more to aggregate volatility, with the
average increase of 11.6%.
Second, we re-calibrate the model under two alternative values of ", 4 and 8. In these
exercises, we continue to assume that the economy is characterized by Zipf's Law, so that
=("   1) is still equal to our baseline value of 1.06. Thus, as we change ", we change 
along with it. The results are presented in the last two rows of Table 7. The size-volatility
relationship is robust to these alternative assumptions. The elasticity of volatility with
respect to country size is similar to the baseline, though slightly lower when " = 4. The
contribution of trade is quite similar as well, with 9.9% and 11.1% for " = 4 and " = 8,
respectively.
Although for all of the alternative models Table 7 reports only the average impact of
trade, it turns out that all of these models preserve the basic patterns found in the baseline:
trade raises volatility relative to autarky in all countries; larger countries, and countries
farther away from major trading partners tend to experience smaller changes in volatility.
5.4 Further Reductions in Trade Costs
The analysis above compares aggregate volatility under today's trade costs and in autarky,
and nds that the impact of trade on volatility has been robustly positive. We now evaluate
how volatility would change if trade costs decreased further from their current levels. Ta-
ble 8 presents the distribution of changes in aggregate volatility relative to its current level
Table A2 estimates the relationship between rm-level volatility { based on either the growth rate of sales
or a measure of \granular residual" following Gabaix (2011) { and its export status and size. Controlling
for size, export status is always insignicant, and even the magnitude of the coecient is exceedingly small,
implying that volatility of exporters is between 96 and 99% of the volatility of non-exporters. Furthermore,
the estimated elasticity of volatility with respect to rm size is similar to what is reported in the literature
and used in the sensitivity check.
24for various magnitudes of trade cost reductions, from 10% to 75%. Strikingly, a further
reduction in trade costs leads to practically no change in volatility on average. For the
median country, a 50% reduction in trade costs increases volatility by only 1.1% relative to
the baseline. Furthermore, while the median volatility does rise slightly as trade costs fall,
the impact always ranges from positive to negative.
What can explain this non-monotonicity? Starting from autarky, as trade costs fall only
the largest rms export, and the distribution of rm size becomes more right-skewed. This
is the main mechanism responsible for the positive eect of trade openness on volatility.
However, as trade costs fall further, the exporting cuto falls, and more and more rms
begin exporting. Eventually, this process will make the rm size distribution less fat-tailed:
when trade costs are so low that everyone exports, there is no selection into exporting, and
the power law in rm size exponent is the same as it was in autarky. Consistent with this
intuition, we nd that the change in aggregate volatility when trade costs fall is closely
correlated with the concomitant change in the share of exporters. Smaller countries tend
to experience the largest increases in the share of exporters, and the greatest decreases in
volatility in this counterfactual. The opposite is true for the biggest countries.
Two additional points are worth making about the impact of further reductions in trade
costs. First, the non-monotonicity is not due to the assumption of free entry. Conrming
the arguments in Section 3.3, the results are virtually the same if we assume xed  Is
i instead.
Second, in the model without intermediates the non-monotonicity disappears: reductions
in trade costs always increase volatility in that model. The source of the dierence is
that without intermediates, a given fall in trade costs leads to a far smaller change in the
exporting cutos than in the model with intermediates. Many fewer rms enter the export
markets, and thus the selection into exporting eect is not reversed as it is in the baseline.
What is the intuition for this dierence? In both models, a global fall in ij has the direct
eect of lowering the rms marginal cost of serving the export markets, and thus makes
the rm more likely to start selling abroad. In a model with intermediates, there is an
additional eect that the fall in ij lowers the cost of the input bundle cs
j, since that input
bundle includes foreign varieties and those are now cheaper. This indirect eect further
lowers the exporting cutos, over and above the direct eect of ij. In the model without
intermediates the indirect eect is absent, since the input bundle is just the wage. It turns
out that quantitatively this makes a large dierence for the results of a reduction in trade
costs.
We conclude from these exercises that while the impact of openness on volatility at the
25current levels of trade costs is robustly positive in all the models we consider, the outcomes of
further reductions in trade costs are sensitive to modelling assumptions about intermediate
input linkages.
6 Conclusion
Recent literature in both macroeconomics and international trade has focused attention on
the role of large rms. Gabaix (2011) demonstrates that if the distribution of rm size
follows a power law with an exponent close to negative 1 { which appears to be the case
in the data { the economy is granular: shocks to the largest rms can lead to aggregate
uctuations.
This paper argues that the preponderance of large rms and their role in aggregate
volatility can help explain two empirical regularities found in cross-country data: (i) smaller
countries are more volatile, and (ii) more open countries are more volatile. We calibrate
and simulate a multi-country model of rm-level production and trade that can generate
granular uctuations. The model matches quite well a number of features of the data, such
as observed bilateral and overall trade volumes, export participation ratios, and the relative
size of the largest rms in dierent countries. We show that the model reproduces the
elasticity of GDP volatility with respect to country size found in the data. The contribu-
tion of international trade to aggregate volatility varies a great deal depending on country
characteristics. While it is minimal in large, relatively closed economies like the U.S. or
Japan, trade increases volatility by up to 15-20% in small open economies such as Denmark
or Romania.
Recent research incorporates heterogeneous rms into fully dynamic general equilib-
rium macroeconomics models, focusing on the impact of persistent aggregate shocks and
rm entry and exit (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Alessandria and Choi, 2007; Ruhl, 2008).
The importance of rm-specic idiosyncratic shocks for macroeconomic volatility via the
granular channel emphasized in this paper should be viewed as complementary to this work.
Future research incorporating these dierent mechanisms, as well as bringing disaggregated
data to the models, will help provide an even more complete picture of the macroeconomic
impact of trade integration.
26Appendix A Data Description and Sources
Data on total GDP, per capita income, and trade openness come from the World Bank's
World Development Indicators database (The World Bank, 2007b). Aggregate volatility
is the standard deviation of the yearly growth rates of per capita GDP in constant local
currency units over the period 1970-2006. Country size is the average share of the country's
nominal U.S. dollar GDP in the world U.S. dollar GDP. Per capita income is the average
real PPP-adjusted per capita GDP. Trade openness is average imports plus exports as a
share of GDP. All the averages are taken over the same period over which the volatility is
computed, 1970-2006.
The gures on Fonterra are obtained from http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/
protability-and-economics/contribution-of-land-based-industries-nz-economic-growth/contribution07.
htm and http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/423466/146647. The data on the 10 largest Korean
business groups come from the Korean Development Institute courtesy of Wonhyuk Lim,
and are for the year 2006.
The data on the Herndahl indices of rm sales and the size of the 10 largest and the
single largest rm come from ORBIS, a large multi-country database published by Bureau
van Dijk that contains information on more than 50 million companies worldwide. The
data come from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, registered lings and
annual reports. Importantly, the database includes both publicly traded and privately held
rms. The main variable used in the analysis is total sales. For each country, we use the
year with the most observations available, which is always between 2006 and 2008. ORBIS
is the largest available non-proprietary rm-level database. Nonetheless, coverage is quite
uneven across countries and years, implying that measures of concentration may not be
reliable or comparable across countries. We alleviate this concern by restricting the sample
of countries to those with a certain minimum numbers of rms, and by using indices that
are less prone to coverage-related biases. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) present a more
complete description of the ORBIS database and further evidence based on these data that
rm size distributions in a large number of countries are extremely fat-tailed.
To obtain values of ij, we use the gravity estimates from the empirical model of Helpman
et al. (2008). Combining geographical characteristics such as bilateral distance, common
border, common language, whether the two countries are in a currency union and others,
with the coecient estimates reported by Helpman et al. (2008) yields, up to a multiplicative
constant, the values of ij for each country pair. We vary the multiplicative constant so as
27to match the mean and median imports/GDP ratios observed in the data in our sample
of countries. Data on bilateral distance, common border, whether the country is an island
or landlocked, common language, and colonial ties are from Centre d'Etudes Prospectives
et Informations Internationales (CEPII). Data on legal origins come from La Porta et al.
(1998). Finally, information on currency unions and free-trade areas come from Rose (2004),
supplemented by internet searches whenever needed. The advantage of the Helpman et al.
(2008) estimates is that they are obtained in an empirical model that accounts explicitly
for both xed and variable costs of exporting, and thus correspond most closely to the
theoretical structure in our paper. Note that in this formulation, ij = ji for all i and j.20
The values of fs
ii and fs
ij are calibrated following di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010). The
Doing Business Indicators database (The World Bank, 2007a) collects information on the
administrative costs of setting up a rm { the time it takes, the number of procedures, and
the monetary cost { in a large sample of countries in the world. The particular variable we
use is the amount of time required to set up a business. We favor this indicator compared
to others that measure entry costs either in dollars or in units of per capita income, because
in our model fs
ii is a quantity of inputs rather than value. We must normalize fs
ii for one
country. Thus, we proceed by setting fs
US;US to a level just high enough to ensure an interior
solution for production cutos.21 Then, for every other country fs
ii is set relative to the
U.S.. To be precise, if according to the Doing Business Indicators database, it takes 10
times longer to register a business in country i than in the U.S., then fs
ii = 10  fs
US;US.
Since we do not have data on xed costs of operating a business that vary by sector, we set
fs
ii to be equal in the N and T sectors.
To measure the xed costs of international trade, we use the Trading Across Borders
module of the Doing Business Indicators. This module provides the costs of exporting a
20-foot dry-cargo container out of each country, as well as the costs of importing the same
kind of container into each country. Parallel to our approach to setting the domestic cost
fs
ii, the indicators we choose are the amount of time required to carry out these transactions.
This ensures that fT
ii and fT
ij are measured in the same units. We take the bilateral xed
cost fT
ij to be the sum of the cost of exporting from country j and the cost of importing
into country i. The foreign trade costs fT
ij are on average about 40% of the domestic entry
costs fT
ii.22
20An earlier version of the paper also computed ij using the estimates of Eaton and Kortum (2002) as a
robustness check. The results were very similar.
21That is, we set f
s
US;US to a level just high enough that a
s
ji < 1=bs for all i;j = 1;:::;C in all the baseline
and counterfactual exercises, with 1=bs being the upper limit of the distribution of a.
22An earlier version of the paper was more agnostic about the nature of domestic xed costs f
T
ii, and
28The bilateral and overall trade volumes as a share of GDP used for comparison to the
model come from the Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund, 2007).
Appendix B The Complete 2-Sector Model










































i (k) = Yi;
where ys
i(k) is nal consumption of good k belonging to sector s = N;T in country i, ps
i(k)
is the price of this good, Yi is total nal consumption expenditure in the economy, and Js
i
is the number of varieties available in sector s in country i coming from all countries. Since
consumer preferences are Cobb-Douglas in CES aggregates of N and T, nal consumption
expenditure on sector N is equal to Yi, and on the T sector, (1   )Yi.
The CES composites of both N and T are used both as consumption and as intermediate
inputs in production. Let Xs
i denote the total spending { nal and intermediate { on sector
s = N;T in country i. Given this total expenditure, it is well known that demand for an










i is the ideal price index of sector s in this economy, (2), augmented with the
appropriate sector superscripts.
Production in both sectors uses both labor and CES composites of N and T as inter-













That is, production in sector s = N;T requires labor, inputs of N, and inputs of T. The
share of labor in value added, s, and the share of non-tradeable inputs in total input usage,
s, both vary by sector.
assumed instead that they are equal (and low) in every country. The results were very similar. In addition,
we carried out the analysis setting the bilateral xed cost to be the sum of domestic costs of starting a






jj. This approach may be preferred if xed
costs of exporting involved more than just shipping, and required, for instance, the exporting rm to create
a subsidiary for the distribution in the destination country. The results were virtually identical.
29Entrepreneurs can pay the exploration cost fe to enter either sector. Each entrepreneur
that entered sector s in country j decides whether or not to pay the xed cost of production
fs
jj, and which, if any, export markets to serve. In the N sector, we assume that trade costs
are innite, and thus a rm in country j may only serve its own market.
The expressions dening the input requirement cutos as
ij, (3) and (4), and the free
entry conditions (5), have the same form (up to the appropriate sector superscripts) and
will hold in each sector. Following similar steps, we derive the expressions for the price

















































































i , and as
ij in terms of Xs
i and cs
i for all i;j = 1;:::;C, it remains to close
the model by solving for the Xs
i 's and wi's. To do this, we impose balanced trade for each
country and the market clearing conditions in each sector and country. Free entry implies
that the total prots are zero, and thus nal expenditure in country i simply equals labor
income: Yi = wiLi. Total expenditure XN
i and XT
i equals nal spending plus expenditure
on sector s as intermediate inputs in both sectors:
XN
i = wiLi + (1   N)NXN
i + (1   T)TXT
i
XT
i = (1   )wiLi + (1   N)(1   N)XN
i + (1   T)(1   T)XT
i :
Note that even though the T sector has both imports and exports, the assumption that only
T-sector goods can be traded amounts to imposing balanced trade within the T sector, and
thus the second condition must be satised in equilibrium as written. These two conditions
imply that total spending in each sector is a constant multiple of labor income wiLi.


























30Using expressions for aT
ji in (4), and PT






































ji for each i = 1;:::;C, as well as the
property that total spending XT
i is a constant multiple of wiLi leads to the following system

































































i = 1;:::;C. There are C  1 independent equations in this system, with wage in one of the
countries as the num eraire.







allocations such that (i) consumers maximize utility; (ii) rms maximize prots, and (iii)
all goods and factor markets clear. The equilibrium is obtained as a solution to (C 1)+2
C+2C equations in wi, PN
i , PT
i ,  IN
i and  IT
i that satises equations (5) for both s = N;T,
(B.1), (B.2), and (B.3) for each i = 1;:::;C. We solve these equations numerically in order
to carry out the main quantitative exercise in this paper.
B.1 Calibrating To Zipf's Law in Firm Size in a Two-Sector Model with
Trade
While Section 3.2 argues that in a one-sector Melitz-Pareto economy, steady-state rm size
follows a power law with exponent =("   1), our quantitative model features two sectors,
idiosyncratic shocks to rm sales, as well as selection into exporting. This section shows
that the aggregate model economy with these additional features will still exhibit Zipf's
Law in rm size.
Deriving an aggregate power law in an economy with two sectors involves computing
the (counter-)cdf of the following mixture of distributions. Let Q be a random variable
that follows a power law with exponent 1 with probability p, and with exponent 2 with
probability 1   p. It is straightforward to show that the counter-cdf of Q is equal to:
31Pr(Q > q) = pD1q 1 + (1   p)D2q 2. Importantly, when 1 = 2 = , Q is itself a power
law with exponent . This means that a two-sector economy in which both sectors follow
a power law with the same exponent will, in aggregate, also exhibit a power law with that
exponent. Our quantitative exercise adopt the assumption that both the N and T sectors
follow Zipf's Law. Though we are not aware of any comprehensive set of estimates of power
law exponents in both traded and non-traded sectors, di Giovanni et al. (2011) estimate
power law exponents for a wide range of both traded and non-traded industries using a
census of French rms, and nd that power law exponents do not dier systematically
between traded and non-traded sectors. It still could be the case that while the reduced
form exponents { which correspond to T=("T   1) and N=("N   1) { are the same, the
actual values of s and "s dier. Since we do not have reliable information about how these
two individual parameters dier across sectors, we adopt the most agnostic and neutral
assumption that both s and "s are the same in the two sectors.
Another concern is that even if steady-state rm size in the aggregate economy follows
Zipf's Law, when rms are hit by idiosyncratic shocks z, the resulting distribution would be
something else. It turns out, however, that power laws are preserved under multiplication
by a random variable with nite variance. That is, if rm sales are driven by a random
productivity that generates Zipf's Law (1=a in our notation), and a nite variance shock
(z), the resulting distribution of sales is still Zipf (Gabaix, 2009, pp. 258-259).
Another point regarding the calibration of power law parameters is that strictly speak-
ing, when not all rms export, selection into exporting implies that the power law exponent
estimated on total sales { domestic plus exporting { is lower than =("   1). Di Giovanni
et al. (2011) explore this bias in detail using the census of French rms, and suggest sev-
eral corrections to the estimating procedure that can be used to estimate =("   1) in an
internally consistent way. Their analysis shows that the bias introduced by selection into
exporting is not large. Corrected estimates obtained by di Giovanni et al. (2011) show that
=("   1) is about 1.05, roughly the same as the value used in the quantitative exercise.
Thus, even though the model is enriched with these additional features, the resulting
distribution of rm size that the model produces still follows Zipf's Law.
32Appendix C Aggregate Volatility Derivation
Firm k in country i with unit input requirement a(k) and realization of transitory shock






































5 ~ z; (C.1)
where 1[] is the indicator function that captures whether rm k serves market j, and ~ z 
z1 "s. We already assumed that Ez (~ z) = 1, and now we further suppose that Varz (~ z) = 2.


















Given the expression for the actual sales of the rm with a transitory shock z(k) in (C.1)
and the expected sales of the rm with productivity a(k) in (C.2), the actual sales as an
approximation around Ez [xs(a(k);z(k))] are








Therefore, the proportional change in xs(a(k);z(k)), or the growth rate, is given by
xs(a(k);z(k))
Ez (xs(a(k);z(k)))
= ~ z   1;







which we assume for simplicity is the same in the two sectors s = N;T. Dropping the sector
superscripts, the total sales in the economy are given by (8), thus the change in the total




















































where h(k) is the share of the rm k's expected sales in total expected sales in the economy.
As expected, the volatility of total output in the economy is equal to the volatility of an
individual rm's output times the Herndahl index of production shares.
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37Table 1. Parameter Values for the Calibrated Model
Parameter Baseline Source
" a 6 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
 b 5.3 Axtell (2001): 
" 1 = 1:06
 0.65 Yi and Zhang (2010)
fN;Tg f0:65;0:35g
1997 U.S. Benchmark Input-Output Table
fN;Tg f0:77;0:35g
ij
c,d 2.30 Helpman et al. (2008)
fii
c 14.24 The World Bank (2007a); normalizing fUS;US
fij
c 7.20 so that nearly all rms the U.S. produce
fe 34.0
To match 7,000,0000 rms in the U.S.
(U.S. Economic Census)
 e 0.1
Standard deviation of sales growth of the top
100 rms in COMPUSTAT
Notes:
a Robustness checks include " = 4 and " = 8.
b Robustness checks include

" 1 = 1:5 and " = 6, so that  = 6:5.
c Average in our sample of 50 countries.
d ij = ji. Trade costs are adjusted by a constant ratio to match the median-level of openness across the
50-country sample.
e Robustness checks include  varying with rm sales:  = Ax
 , where  = 1=6.
38Table 2. Top 49 Countries and the Rest of the World in Terms of 2006 GDP
GDP/ GDP/
Country World GDP Country World GDP
United States 0.300 Indonesia 0.006
Japan 0.124 South Africa 0.006
Germany 0.076 Norway 0.006
France 0.054 Poland 0.005
United Kingdom 0.044 Finland 0.005
Italy 0.041 Greece 0.004
China 0.028 Venezuela, RB 0.004
Canada 0.026 Thailand 0.004
Brazil 0.021 Portugal 0.003
Spain 0.020 Colombia 0.003
India 0.017 Nigeria 0.003
Australia 0.016 Algeria 0.003
Russian Federation 0.015 Israel 0.003
Mexico 0.015 Philippines 0.003
Netherlands 0.015 Malaysia 0.002
Korea, Rep. 0.011 Ireland 0.002
Sweden 0.010 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.002
Switzerland 0.010 Pakistan 0.002
Belgium 0.009 Chile 0.002
Argentina 0.008 New Zealand 0.002
Saudi Arabia 0.007 Czech Republic 0.002
Austria 0.007 United Arab Emirates 0.002
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.007 Hungary 0.002
Turkey 0.007 Romania 0.002
Denmark 0.006 Rest of the World 0.027
Notes: Ranking of top 49 countries and the rest of the world in terms of 2006 U.S.$ GDP. We include Hong
Kong, POC, and Singapore in Rest of the World. Source: The World Bank (2007b).
39Table 3. Bilateral Trade Shares: Data and Model Predictions
Model Data








Notes: This table reports the means and medians of domestic output (top panel), and bilateral trade (bottom
panel), both as a share of domestic absorption, in the model and in the data. Source: International Monetary
Fund (2007).
Table 4. Export Participation: Data and Model Predictions for Whole Economy and
Tradeable Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model Data
Country Total Tradeable Total Tradeable
United States 0.010 0.018 0.040 0.150
Germany 0.111 0.238 0.100 ...
France 0.029 0.065 0.040 0.090
Argentina 0.112 0.352 ... 0.422
Colombia 0.148 0.548 ... 0.363
Ireland 0.332 1.000 ... 0.740
Chile 0.095 0.335 0.105 ...
New Zealand 0.062 0.189 0.051 0.135
Notes: This table compares, for selected countries, the share of exporters among all rms in the model
(column 1) and the share of exporters among the tradeable sector rms in the model (column 2) with
available estimates of corresponding shares in existing literature. Since for some countries, data are reported
relative to all the rms in the economy, while for other countries it is reported relative to all the rms in
the traded sector, column 3 (data) should be compared to column 1 (model), and column 4 (data) should
be compared to Column 2 (model). For the United States, data are imputed based on publicly available
U.S. Economic Census data on the numbers of rms by sector, together with the summary statistics for the
numbers of exporters reported in Bernard et al. (2007). Data for France is based on authors' calculations
using the French Census data in di Giovanni et al. (2011). Data for Germany are from Arndt et al. (2009)
(Table A2). Data for Argentina come from Bustos (2011), Table D.1. For New Zealand, data come from
Fabling and Sanderson (2008), Table 4. Data on Ireland come from Fitzgerald and Haller (2010), Table 1.
Data for Chile come from private communication with Miguel Fuentes at the Central Bank of Chile. Data








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Table 6. Aggregate Volatility: Data and Model Predictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var: Log(GDP Volatility)
Log(T) 1.578** 1.365** 1.099** 0.765**
(0.244) (0.321) (0.287) (0.274)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.093 -0.098 -0.146*
(0.073) (0.065) (0.060)
Log(Risk Content of Exports) 0.100+ -0.064
(0.053) (0.052)
Log(Herndahl of Production) -0.134
(0.217)
Constant 3.490** 3.417** 2.994** 0.282
(1.092) (1.145) (1.079) (1.045)
Observations 49 49 47 35
R2 0.353 0.378 0.477 0.450
Notes: The dependent variable is the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth over the period 1970-
2006. T is the aggregate volatility implied by the simulated model. GDP per capita is the PPP-adjusted
per capita GDP. Risk Content of Exports is the measure of the volatility of a country's export pattern taken
from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2011). Herndahl of Production is the Herndahl index of industry-level
production shares, taken from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%.






T = N = 1 -0.145 1.238
 = Ax  -0.286 1.291
 = 1:5 -0.123 1.116
" = 4 -0.119 1.099
" = 8 -0.138 1.111
Notes: This table reports (1) the coecient of regressing the log of aggregate volatility on the log of country
size (Size) in the trade equilibrium, and (2) the contribution of international trade to aggregate volatility
(ratio of volatility under trade to the volatility in autarky) under alternative assumptions. Row 1 reports
the results for the baseline trade equilibrium simulation. Row 2 reports the results of a simulation without
free entry. Row 3 reports the results of a simulation without intermediates. Row 4 reports the results of a
simulation in which the rm-specic volatility decreases in rm size. Row 5 reports the results of applying
a power law coecient of 1.5 rather than the baseline of 1.06. Rows 6 and 7 report the results when using
an elasticity of substitution of 4 or 8, respectively.
42Table 8. The Impact of Further Reductions in Trade Costs on Aggregate Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentage Reduction in Trade Costs
10% 25% 50% 75%
Percentile
5 0.998 0.994 0.984 1.003
10 0.998 0.998 0.991 1.006
25 1.001 1.003 1.001 1.017
50 1.004 1.011 1.011 1.034
75 1.011 1.022 1.036 1.075
95 1.019 1.036 1.055 1.129
min 0.995 0.988 0.973 0.990
max 1.030 1.050 1.084 1.167
Notes: This table reports percentiles and minimum and maximums of the ratio of aggregate volatility under
a four reductions in iceberg trade costs ij to the aggregate volatility as implied by the model under current
trade costs.

























































(b) Partial Correlation Between Trade Openness and Aggregate Volatility
Notes: These ﬁgures report the partial correlation plot of aggregate volatility, measured as the standard
deviation of the annual growth rate of per capita GDP over 1970-2006, on the y-axis against (a) country size
on the x-axis, and (b) trade openness on the x-axis, both after netting out the impact of per capita income.
Both axes are in log scale. Source: The World Bank (2007b).



















Sales/GDP  Exports/Total Exports 
Notes: This ﬁgure reports the 2006 sales of the top 10 Korean business groups, as a share of Korean GDP
(blue/dark bars) and total Korean exports (red/light bars). Source: Korean Development Institute.
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(b) Country Size and the Size of the 10 Largest Firms
Notes: These ﬁgures present the scatterplots of log country size and (a) the log Herﬁndahl index of ﬁrm
sales; (b) the log size of the 10 largest ﬁrms, and (c) the log size of the largest ﬁrm, in all cases after netting
out per capita GDP. The countries with more than 1000 ﬁrms with sales data are labeled with ♦’s; the
countries with between 100 and 1000 ﬁrms with sales data are labeled with  ’s, and the countries with less
than 100 ﬁrms with sales data with ◦’s. The regression lines through the samples of (i) all countries; (ii)
countries with ≥100 ﬁrms; and (iii) countries with ≥1000 ﬁrms are plotted through the data. Both axes are
in log scale. Sources: ORBIS and The World Bank (2007b).
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(c) Country Size and the Size of the Largest Firm
Notes: These ﬁgures present the scatterplots of log country size and (a) the log Herﬁndahl index of ﬁrm
sales; (b) the log size of the 10 largest ﬁrms, and (c) the log size of the largest ﬁrm, in all cases after netting
out per capita GDP. The countries with more than 1000 ﬁrms with sales data are labeled with ♦’s; the
countries with between 100 and 1000 ﬁrms with sales data are labeled with  ’s, and the countries with less
than 100 ﬁrms with sales data with ◦’s. The regression lines through the samples of (i) all countries; (ii)
countries with ≥100 ﬁrms; and (iii) countries with ≥1000 ﬁrms are plotted through the data. Both axes are
in log scale. Sources: ORBIS and The World Bank (2007b).
47Figure 4. The Timing of the Economy

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Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the distribution of ﬁrm size, measured by sales, and how it changes as it moves
from Autarky to a 2-Country Trade equilibrium, and ﬁnally to a C-Country Trade equilibrium. In the two-
country case, there is a single productivity cutoﬀ, above which ﬁrms export abroad. Compared to autarky,
there is a higher probability of ﬁnding larger ﬁrms above this cutoﬀ. In the C-country case, with multiple
export markets there will be cutoﬀs for each market, with progressively more productive ﬁrms exporting to
more and more markets and growing larger and larger relative to domestic GDP.


































































(a) Bilateral Trade Shares







































































Notes: Figure (a) reports the scatterplot of domestic output (πii) and bilateral trade (πij), both as a
share of country i GDP. Solid dots represent observations of πii, while hollow dots represent bilateral trade
observations (πij). Both axes are in log scale. Figure (b) reports the scatterplot of total imports as a share
of GDP. In both ﬁgures, the values implied by the model are on the horizontal axis; actual values are on
the vertical axis, and the line through the data is the 45-degree line. Source: International Monetary Fund
(2007).
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the relationship between country size and aggregate volatility implied by the data
(conditioning for per capita GDP), the model under trade, and the model in autarky. The dots represent
actual observations of volatility. Note that the data points and regression line are shifted by a constant for
ease of visual comparability with the model regressions lines. Source: The World Bank (2007b).
50Table A1. Aggregate Volatility and Country Size Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var: Log(GDP Volatility)
Log(Size) -0.177** -0.139** -0.090+ -0.209** -0.180** -0.142**
(0.038) (0.044) (0.045) (0.035) (0.027) (0.023)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.157* -0.261** -0.049 -0.019 0.018
(0.069) (0.070) (0.057) (0.045) (0.037)
Constant -4.352** -2.696** -1.533+ -4.010** -4.154** -4.291**
(0.190) (0.763) (0.773) (0.601) (0.473) (0.410)
Observations 49 49 30 75 100 143
R2 0.192 0.273 0.337 0.328 0.296 0.225
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth over the period
1970-2006. Size is a country’s GDP as a share of world GDP; GDP per capita is PPP-adjusted per capita
income. All right-hand side variables are averages over 1970-2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
51Table A2. U.S. Evidence on Relationship between Firm-Level Volatility and Exporter
Status and Size
(A) Sample period: 1980-2007
Growth Granular
(1) (2) (1) (2)
All Restricted All Restricted
Exporter -0.022 -0.014 -0.024 -0.017
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
Log(Sales) -0.129** -0.135** -0.128** -0.133**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 15,901 14,597 15,859 14,558
Number of SIC 440 415 427 403
R2 0.181 0.183 0.198 0.201
(B) Sample period: 1980-1989
Growth Granular
(1) (2) (1) (2)
All Restricted All Restricted
Exporter -0.020 -0.013 -0.010 -0.013
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
Log(Sales) -0.128** -0.133** -0.126** -0.133**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 8,529 7,693 8,509 7,693
Number of SIC 435 410 422 410
R2 0.171 0.170 0.181 0.170
(C) Sample period: 1990-2007
Growth Granular
(1) (2) (1) (2)
All Restricted All Restricted
Exporter -0.025 -0.021 -0.041 -0.036
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
Log(Sales) -0.136** -0.140** -0.134** -0.140**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of SIC 409 386 398 375
Observations 6,881 6,467 6,857 6,443
R2 0.149 0.151 0.165 0.174
Notes: This table presents the results from regressing a measure of ﬁrm-level sales volatility on measures of
its export status (‘Exporter’) and size (‘Sales’). Columns (1) and (2) (‘Growth’) take the natural logarithm
of the standard deviation of ﬁrm real sales as the dependent variable. Columns of (3) and (4) (‘Granular’)
uses a granular volatility measure, calculated as the standard deviation of the estimated residuals, ˆ εist, from
the following ﬁrm-level panel regression: Δlog(Salesist)=αi + αst + εist,w h e r ei is a ﬁrm, s is a sector,
and t i saq u a r t e r ,s ot h a tαi is a ﬁrm-level eﬀect, and αst is a sector×time eﬀect. Standard deviations are
calculated over the given sample period, while export status and measures of ﬁrm size are averaged over
the period. Regressions include sector-level ﬁxed eﬀects at the 4-digit SIC. ‘All’ includes all ﬁrms, while
‘Restricted’ excludes ﬁrms in the commodity, energy, and public sectors. Data are taken from the Compustat
Quarterly database of listed U.S. ﬁrms together with information on whether a ﬁrm is an exporter from the
Compustat Segments database. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant
at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. 52